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ABSTRACT 
While it is widely accepted that lesions to orbital prefrontal cortex lead to emotion 
related disruptions and poor decision-making, there is very little patient data on this issue 
involving actual logical reasoning tasks. We tested patients with circumscribed, focal 
lesions largely confined to polar/orbital prefrontal cortex (BA 10 & 11) (N=17) on logical 
reasoning tasks involving neutral and emotional content, and compared their performance 
to that of an age and education-matched normal control group (N=22) and a posterior 
lesion control group (N=24). Our results revealed a significant group by content 
interaction driven by a selective impairment in the polar/orbital prefrontal cortex group 
compared to healthy normal controls and to the parietal patient group, in the emotional 
content reasoning trials. Subsequent analyses of congruent and incongruent reasoning 
trials indicated that this impairment was driven by the poor performance of patients with 
polar/orbital lesions in the incongruent trials. We conclude that the polar/orbital 
prefrontal cortex plays a critical role in filtering emotionally charged content from the 
material before it is passed on to the reasoning system in lateral/dorsal regions of 
prefrontal cortex. Where unfiltered content is passed to the reasoning engine, either as a 
result of pathology (as in the case of our patients) or as a result of individual differences, 
reasoning performance suffers.  
 
Keywords: Emotions, logical reasoning, decision making, frontal lobe lesions, hot and 
cold reasoning
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INTRODUCTION 
Reasoning is the process of evaluating arguments. Arguments provide 
rationale/reasons for actions. Real-world human reasoning always occurs against a 
backdrop of beliefs embedded in an emotional context. Hume suggested that without 
emotions, reasons may not lead to actions (Cohon, 2010). Seneca held that emotions 
"unfettered by reason" can have disastrous effects (Vogt, 2013). In the normal healthy 
population, there is a delicate balance between emotional and rational reasoning 
processes that is critical to our well-being, social interactions, and indeed survival. We 
have all experienced situations where this balance has been disrupted, often with 
significant consequences for our behaviour.  
The importance & pervasiveness of emotions on the reasoning process can be 
illustrated by an advertisement aired by the National Republican Trust Political Action 
Committee in America, in the Fall of 2010, designed to stop the construction of a mosque 
in NY near the site of the 9/11 attacks 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mjGJPPRD3u0): 
The call "Allah u Akbar…." rings out from a mosque. The words 
"The Audacity of Jihad" appear on the screen followed by images 
of hooded, armed men in Arab/Muslim garb firing guns and 
engaging in battle. This is followed by images of airplanes 
crashing into the Twin Towers on September 11. The announcer 
begins:  
"On September 11 they declared war against us. To celebrate that 
murder of 3000 Americans they want to build a monstrous 13 
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story mosque at Ground Zero [images of the Dome of the Rock 
mosque (Jerusalem)]. This ground is sacred [images of Ground 
Zero debris]. Where we weep [image of a weeping man wrapped 
in an American flag] they rejoice [images of Muslim men 
rejoicing]. That mosque is a monument to their victory and an 
invitation for war [images of armed Muslim men marching]. A 
mosque at Ground Zero must not stand [images of firefighters 
amid the debris of Ground Zero]. The political class has said 
nothing [images of Capitol Hill and President Obama]. The 
politicians are doing nothing to stop it. But we Americans will be 
heard. Join the fight to kill the Ground Zero mosque [images of 
the Dome of the Rock mosque]." 
The advert used provocative words, images, music and text to arouse fear and 
hatred and essentially make the following argument: 
 (A) 
All the 9/11 perpetrators were Muslims; 
All the 9/11 perpetrators were terrorists; 
Therefore all Muslims are terrorists 
Millions of Americans were moved to action by this and similar arguments. Such 
arguments helped to channel opinion, money, and votes, and had enormous political 
consequences for congressional elections.  Despite its effectiveness, the argument is, of 
course, fallacious. Among other shortcomings, it uses words and images to facilitate 
the commitment of a part/whole fallacy. 
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Many of the Americans convinced by the above argument would probably be less 
impressed by the following equivalent argument:  
(B) 
All roses are flowers; 
All roses have thorns; 
Therefore all flowers have thorns. 
The logical form and the truth and falsity of the propositions in each case are 
identical. Where they differ is that the first arouses our emotions while the second does 
not. Several studies confirm that emotional content affects the evaluation of logical 
arguments (Blanchette, 2006; Blanchette & Richards, 2004; Blanchette, Richards, 
Melnyk, & Lavda, 2007; Goel & Vartanian, 2010) . 
This critical balance between the rational and emotional can be permanently 
disrupted in neurological patients with lesions to the prefrontal cortex (PFC). Some of 
these patients, often with lesions to orbital PFC, exhibit aberrant emotional responses 
(Shallice & Cooper, 2011; Stuss & Levine, 2002) and – despite largely intact cognitive 
systems – also make poor decisions in real-life situations (with respect to jobs, 
relationships, finances etc.) (Adolphs, Tranel, Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 1996; 
Fellows & Farah, 2007), perhaps as a consequence of disruptions in the emotional system 
(A. R. Damasio, 1994). However, there are very few studies directly examining the role 
of emotional content in logical reasoning processes. 
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To test for the involvement of PFC in reasoning about emotional content we 
administered categorical syllogisms, containing neutral content or emotional content, to 
neurological patients with focal lesions in polar/orbital PFC (BA 10 and 11), patients 
with focal parietal lesions (PL) and normal controls. Categorical syllogisms are 
Aristotelian logical forms involving reasoning with quantifiers (all, some) and negation. 
While we are rarely called upon to solve actual syllogisms in real-life, the underlying 
principles of quantification and negation are critical for everyday reasoning. Indeed, the 
part/whole fallacy in the above example is a quantification issue.  
Activation in left lateral/dorsolateral PFC (BA 44, 45, 47, 9, 6) is widely reported 
for syllogistic reasoning tasks with neutral material in neuroimaging studies (Goel, 2007; 
Goel, Buchel, Frith, & Dolan, 2000; Goel & Dolan, 2003a; Knauff, Fangmeier, Ruff, & 
Johnson-Laird, 2003; Reverberi et al., 2012; Baggio et al., 2016). One of the few lesion 
studies of deductive reasoning reported that patients with left lateral and superior medial 
frontal lesions performed poorly on elementary deductive reasoning problems (Reverberi 
et al., 2009).  However, one imaging study (Goel & Dolan, 2003b) which used both 
neutral and emotionally salient logical arguments activated left lateral/dorsolateral (BA 
46, 8) PFC in the former condition, and medial ventral (BA 25, 11) PFC in the emotion 
condition. Therefore, we hypothesized that patients with lesions to polar orbital PFC 
(including BA 11 and 10) would be selectively impaired in reasoning trials involving 
emotional content but not in reasoning trials involving neutral content. 
 
METHOD 
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Subjects 
All participants were right handed males selected from Phase 3 of the Vietnam 
Head Injury Study (Raymont, Salazar, Krueger, & Grafman, 2011). These individuals 
came from similar socio-economic and educational backgrounds and served in Vietnam 
during the late 60s and early 70s. Both normal controls and patients were recruited from 
this cohort. The patients all received penetrating head injuries during their service in 
Vietnam. Thus their etiology, injury dates, and recovery periods were similar. Their 
sensory, motor, cognitive and language functions, as determined by the 
neuropsychological assessment, were relatively intact (see below). The normal control 
participants (N = 22) also served in Vietnam but did not receive head injuries.  
The selection criteria for the patient group of interest was focal, circumscribed, 
unilateral lesions (less than 50 cc in extent) confined to polar/orbital PFC (largely BA 10 
& 11), and specifically minimizing lateral and dorsal lateral PFC damage (BA 44, 45, 46, 
and 9).  These criteria were based upon findings reported in Goel and Dolan (2003b).
1
 
Given that we selected for unilateral lesions, it was also important to balance for known 
hemispheric differences in logical reasoning (Goel, 2007). Seventeen patients (out of a 
cohort of 130) met these criteria. Of these, nine patients had unilateral lesions to left 
                                                        
1 Based on Goel and Dolan (2003b), we ideally wanted to target patients with anterior 
medial lesions and left dorsal lateral lesions, and compare the two in neutral and emotion-
laden logical thinking tasks. Unfortunately, only two patients in our cohort had lesions 
restricted to left lateral/dorsal PFC. Thus it was not possible to have a left dorsolateral 
group. We therefore selected all patients with lesions to anterior medial regions and 
compared their performance with that of patients with parietal lesions. 
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polar/orbital PFC and eight to right polar/orbital PFC.
2
 A group of patients (N=24) with 
posterior lesions, largely confined to parietal lobes (PL), (specifically excluding 
prefrontal cortex) served as a patient control group. The experimental protocol was 
approved by the Naval Hospital (Bethesda) Institutional Review Board, and all 
participants understood the study procedures and gave informed consent. 
Neuropsychological Assessment 
All participants completed the AFQT-7A (Eitelberg, Laurence, Waters, & 
Perelman, 1984) upon induction into the Armed Forces, and rewrote it as part of their 
neuropsychological assessment as part of this study.
3
 Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale 
(WAIS-III) (Wechsler, 1997a) and Wechsler Memory Scale (WMS-III) (Wechsler, 
1997b) were administered to assess participants’ cognitive functioning level. 
Psychological and emotional functioning was assessed by Beck Depression Inventory 
(BDI) (Beck, 1987) and Global Assessment Functioning (SCID-GAF) (First, Spitzer, 
Gibbo, & Williams, 2002). The age, education, cognitive profiles (IQ and Working 
Memory), including pre-injury and post injury AFQT scores, emotional and 
psychological measurements (BDI and SCID), along with the size of lesion (see below) 
are noted in Table 1.  
                                                        
2 Patients 2218 and 2351, in additions to large lesions in right BA 10 and BA 11, do have 
sizable lesions in right lateral PFC (Table 2). They were nonetheless included to balance 
for known hemispheric differences in logical reasoning. The results do not change if 
these patients are excluded. 
3 The Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) is a standardized test that measures a candidate’s 
abilities in the areas of paragraph comprehension, word knowledge, arithmetic reasoning, and 
mathematics knowledge. It is administerested to all members of the USA Armed Forces. 
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There were no significant group differences in AFQT-7A scores (either pre- or 
post-injury), volume loss due to lesion (between the two patient groups), years of 
education, WAIS III IQ , SCID-GAF, or BDI scores. Only WMS-III Working Memory 
scores differed across groups, F(2, 59) = 5.716, p = 0.005. Post-hoc tests, after 
adjustment for multiple comparisons using Bonferroni, indicated that working memory 
scores were significantly lower (p = .004) in the parietal control group (mean 92.13, SE 
2.81, n = 23) than in the normal control group (mean 104.77, SE 2.90, n = 22),  but there 
were no significant differences (p = .164) in WM scores between orbital/polar PFC 
patients (mean 96.76, SE 2.39, n = 17) and normal controls or between the two patient 
groups (p = .769). 
------------------------ 
Table 1  
-------------------------- 
 
Lesion Size, Location and Extent 
The lesion sites, total volume loss, and intersection of lesion sites with BAs, as 
determined from patient computerized tomography (CT) scans, are specified in summary 
overlay images in Figure 1; see also Table 1 and Tables 2 & 3. The CT scans were 
acquired on a GE Light Speed Plus CT scanner in helical mode (150 slices per subject, 
field of view covering head only). Images were reconstructed with an in-plane voxel size 
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of 0.4 x 0.4 mm, overlapping slice thickness of 2.5 mm, and a 1 mm slice interval. Skull 
and scalp components were removed using the BET algorithm in MEDx (Medical 
Numerics Inc., Sterling, VA). Patient CT volumes were imported into ABLe (Medical 
Numerics Inc.) software (Makale et al., 2002) and displayed as a series of slices in a light 
box format. A trained neuropsychiatrist manually traced the lesions on all relevant slices. 
The tracings were then reviewed by J.G., who was blind to the results of the 
neuropsychological testing. Lesion location and volume were determined from the CT 
images using the Analysis of Brain Lesion software (ABLe) (Makale et al., 2002; 
Solomon, Raymont, Braun, Butman, & Grafman, 2007) contained in MEDx v3.44 
(Medical Numerics) with enhancements to support the Automated Anatomical Labeling 
atlas (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002). Total lesion volume (in cubic centimeters) and 
lesion volume, as a percentage of total brain volume (Tables 2 & 3), was calculated by 
voxel count.  
The patient volume was then normalized to a reference template volume by a 12-
parameter affine linear transformation (allowing for translation, rotation, scaling, and 
shearing). The lesion voxels were included in the registration process. The ABLe 
reference volume is an MRI of a 27-year-old normal male transformed to Talairach space 
with a 12-parameter affine linear transformation. The volume is resliced at 17 degrees 
relative to the inferior orbitomeatal line, and 11 transverse slices that best match the 
Damasio & Damasio (1989) templates have been selected by a neuroradiologist and 
interactively labeled with BAs by reference to the Damasio & Damasio templates. 
Although the locations of BAs in these templates are approximate, they are widely 
accepted in the neuropsychology and neurology communities.  
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The registered patient volume was then resliced at a 17-degree cranial angle, and 
the 11 sections that matched the ABLe reference volume (and hence the Damasio & 
Damasio templates) were automatically extracted. Because the BAs are premarked on the 
11 slices of the ABLe reference volume (see above) and the patient brain volume has 
been registered and resliced to conform to this template, the intersection of lesion with 
BAs was calculated by a simple voxel-by-voxel comparison.  
The overlay images in Figure 1a highlight the fact that the frontal lobe patients 
had lesions centered in left or right BA 10 and 11. On average, 30.98% (16.60) of BA 10 
and 13.23% (13.54) of BA 11 were intersected by the lesions. Lesion intersection of 
lateral and dorsal areas was much more limited (BA 46 = 4.99% (9.22); BA 9 = 3.56% 
(6.04); BA 44 = 0.11% (0.47); BA 45 = 1.65% (4.84)). Lesion extent by BA for each 
frontal lobe patient is specified in Table 2. The lesions in the parietal control group were 
more broadly distributed, but did not involve prefrontal cortex, as illustrated in Figure 1b 
and noted in Table 3. 
One concern with traumatic injury patients is contre-coup brain injury associated 
with significant force and trauma. However, there is no strong evidence that penetrating 
traumatic brain injury due to shell fragments, which is the cause of damage to our patient 
population, routinely results in counter-coup effects (Grafman & Salazar, 1987). 
Certainly our CT scan analysis only rarely gave such hints. While we cannot eliminate 
the possibility of any microscopic damage (only an autopsy could do that), based on CT 
scan data, we believe that most of the injury imparted from the penetrating brain wounds 
occurred at the point of entry and along the missile path. 
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Task, Experimental Design, and Stimuli 
Participants were presented with 40 categorical syllogisms via a computer script 
and asked to determine if the conclusion followed logically from the premises. Half the 
trials contained items with neutral content (e.g. All airplanes can fly; Some boats cannot 
fly; Some boats are not airplanes) while the other half contained syllogisms with 
emotionally-charged negative content (e.g. Some terrorists are Iraqis; All Iraqis are 
Arabs; Some Arabs are terrorists). The logical forms in both conditions were identical. 
Whenever we are reasoning about real-world knowledge, that is, content we have 
beliefs about, we are subject to a robust phenomenon known as the belief-bias effect 
(Evans, Barston, & Pollard, 1983; Wilkins, 1928). In such situations our reasoning ability 
is biased by our knowledge of the world (i.e. beliefs). We are much more likely to judge a 
valid argument with a believable conclusion as valid and an invalid argument with an 
unbelievable conclusion as invalid, than an invalid argument with a believable conclusion 
as invalid and a valid argument with a unbelievable conclusion as valid. The former types 
of arguments are referred to as congruent (because believability of the conclusion 
facilitates the logical inference) and the latter are referred to as incongruent (because 
believability of the conclusion inhibits the logical inference). The number of congruent 
and incongruent trials was matched across conditions.  
Deductive arguments are either valid or invalid. They can be invalid by virtue of 
being either inconsistent or indeterminate. In an inconsistent argument the conclusion is 
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inconsistent with the information stated in the premises (e.g. “No fruit are blue. Some 
apples are fruit. All apples are blue”). In an indeterminate argument there is no 
inconsistency, but an indeterminacy in that the premises do not provide enough 
information to warrant the conclusion (e.g. “No Cuban cigars are dogs. No Cuban cigars 
are cats. No cats are dogs”). Both types of invalid arguments were included to control for 
the fact that they draw upon different neural systems (Goel et al., 2007). 
To have a sufficient number of trials in the inconsistent invalid and indeterminate 
invalid categories we increased the number of invalid trials from 8 to 12, resulting in a 
slight imbalance with valid trials, but allowing sufficient number of trials in each 
condition for the planned analyses. Overall, we matched the difficulty level of syllogisms 
within each condition by choosing syllogism moods/figures according to published data 
(Dickstein, 1978). 
Twenty emotionally salient and 20 emotionally neutral syllogisms were organized 
into a 3 Group x 2 Content x 2 Congruency factorial design.
4
 The first factor Group 
consisted of three levels: polar/orbital PFC group, parietal (PL) group, and healthy 
                                                        
4 We chose not to use determinacy as a fourth factor due to concerns about sufficient 
number of trials in each cell. There are known hemispheric differences in the processing 
of determinate and indeterminate trials (Goel et al., 2007). We chose to deal with this 
issue by balancing for determinacy across reasoning categories and hemisphere across 
frontal lobe patient selection. But at the request of a reviewer we've carried out a mixed 3 
x 2 x 2 ANOVA with Group (polar/orbital PFC, PL, NC) as a between-subjects factor 
and Content (Neutral and Emotional) and Invalidity (Inconsistent/determinate and 
Indeterminate) as within-subjects factors. The results are reported in the supplementary 
material. To summarize, accuracy was significantly higher (collapsed across all groups) 
for ‘inconsistently invalid’ than for ‘indeterminately invalid’ trials, but there was no 
significant difference among groups and no significant Group X Invalidity interaction. 
There was an expected Group by Content interaction. 
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normal control (NC) group. The second factor Content consisted of two levels: 
emotionally neutral content and emotionally salient content. All emotionally salient 
syllogisms contained negative emotion. The logical forms in both conditions were 
identical. The third factor Congruency contained 10 congruent (i.e., 4 Valid and True + 6 
Invalid and False) and 10 incongruent (i.e., 4 Valid and False + 6 Invalid and True) trials. 
Trials were presented in two blocks of 20 items (for a total of 40), with an opportunity to 
rest between blocks. Sample stimuli items are reproduced in Table 4 and the complete set 
of stimuli are reproduced in Appendix A in Supplementary Materials.  
Subjects were given an explanation of logical validity along with several 
examples. Once they understood the concept of validity they were given the task and 
instructed (in writing) as follows: “Your task is to determine if the 3rd sentence follows 
logically from, or is entailed by, the first two sentences. If it does follow logically, reply 
by pressing the designated ‘yes’ key. Otherwise, press the designated ‘no’ key. Each trial 
will remain on the screen until you have responded. Once you have responded, the next 
screen will appear. Proceed as quickly and as accurately as possible. To begin, press the 
space bar.” There was no time restriction on trials. Once a participant’s response was 
entered, the next trial followed. As will be shown below, participants’ accuracy scores 
during the experiment make it clear that they understood the directions.  
After completing the reasoning task, participants were presented with the 
conclusion of each argument (e.g., All men are smokers) and asked to give it a 
believability score on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 was very unbelievable and 5 was very 
believable. Subsequently participants were also asked to judge the content of each 
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emotional syllogism for valence and arousal, using one keypress, using a categorical 
scale: negative/high arousal=1, negative/low arousal=2, positive/high arousal=3, 
positive/low arousal=4. 
Post-Experiment Data Adjustments 
As noted above, the conditions were balanced for congruency. However, a few 
adjustments were made before conducting the statistical analysis. First, due to a 
programming error, participants’ response to one of the congruent syllogisms with neutral 
content was not recorded, resulting in 19 trials in the neutral category. Second, 
congruency is a function of the reasoners’ beliefs. In preparing the stimuli we can guess 
what these beliefs will be, but we could be wrong for any particular subject. Therefore, 
congruency of an item was determined on a trial by trial, subject by subject basis 
according to each individual's response to the believability questionnaire. For example, 
the argument “Some animals eat children. All animals are pets. Some pets eat children” 
was initially categorized as an incongruent syllogism (i.e., valid but unbelievable). 
However, depending on each participant’s believability rating, the same argument could 
be categorized as a congruent syllogism if a participant found the conclusion to be 
believable. The average number of congruent and incongruent trials remained relatively 
balanced after the adjustment [i.e., neutral congruent vs. neutral incongruent = 9.62 (1.47) 
vs. 9.32 (1.30); emotional congruent vs. emotional incongruent = 9.38 (1.41) vs. 10.6 
(1.41).]  
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Results 
Overall accuracy (proportion correct:total) in reasoning task performance was 0.733 (SD 
= .171), indicating that participants were able to infer accurately at above chance level 
(i.e., 0.50) and were engaged in the reasoning task. All reported results are corrected for 
multiple comparisons. 
 
Group by Content by Congruency: Mean Accuracy Scores 
The mean accuracy of responses was first analyzed using a mixed 3 x 2 x 2 
ANOVA with Group (polar/orbital PFC, PL, NC) as a between-subjects factor and 
Content (Neutral and Emotional) and Congruency (Congruent and Incongruent) as 
within-subjects factors. There was no significant main effect of Content or Group. An 
expected main effect of Congruency was found (F1, 43 = 66.109, p < 0.001), confirming 
that all groups provided more logical responses in the congruent condition (M = .828, SE 
= .022) than in the incongruent condition (M =. 621, SE =.029).  There was no significant 
three-way interaction (Group x Content x Congruency; F2, 43 = 2.402, p = 0.103). A 
significant interaction effect of Group x Content was observed (F2, 43 =  6.678, p = 0.003). 
See Figure 2.  
Two follow-up univariate analyses showed that there were no significant group 
differences on neutral reasoning (F2, 52 = .398, p = 0.674), but that there was a significant 
difference among groups on emotional reasoning (F2, 51 = 5.083, p = 0.01). Post-hoc tests 
using Bonferroni showed that the mean proportion of correct responses to emotional trials 
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was significantly lower (p = .024) in the polar/orbital group (M = .624, SE = .041) than in 
the normal healthy control group (M = .772, SE = .037), and significantly lower in the 
polar/orbital group (p = .015) than in the parietal group (M = 780, SE = .029), but there 
was no significant difference between the parietal group and the normal control group (p 
= 1.000). All of these follow-up tests survived correction for multiple comparisons using 
Bonferroni. 
Paired t-tests, comparing the mean proportion of correct responses to neutral 
versus emotional trials within each group indicated that, after Bonferroni correction for 
multiple comparisons (critical value of p: .05/3 = 0.0166667), there were no significant 
differences within any of the three groups (polar/orbital p = .049; parietal p = .022; 
normal controls p = .372).   
We also conducted the corresponding analysis of mean reaction time (Group by 
Content by Congruency). There was no significant effect of Group nor any significant 
Group by Content by Congruency interaction. See Supplementary Material for details. 
 
Further Investigations 
To investigate further the impairment of the polar / orbital group on emotional trials, we 
pursed several lines of enquiry: a possible effect of congruence (between logic and 
believability), a possible effect of strength of beliefs about the argument conclusion, a 
possible effect of differential emotional response to trials, and possible correlations 
between percentage volume loss in particular BA areas and performance on the reasoning 




To determine whether the congruency of syllogisms plays any role on the effect of 
interest, we further examined the data by looking at the congruent and incongruent trials 
separately. Even though the three-way interaction of Group x Content x Congruency was 
found to be not significant, the pattern of results of the polar/orbital PFC patients 
reasoning about congruent and incongruent trials differed from that of the controls 
(Figure 3). Additionally, studies have shown that mediation between belief and emotion 
can have differential impact on congruent and incongruent reasoning trials (Goel & 
Vartarnian, 2010).   
Therefore, we conducted a mixed ANOVA (3 Group x 2 Congruence, on 
emotional trials only), and found a significant difference among groups for emotional 
items (F2, 51 = 5.102, p = 0.01). There was a main effect of Congruence (F1, 51 = 68.992, p 
< 0.001); accuracy was significantly higher to emotionally congruent (M = .845, SD = 
.02) than to emotionally incongruent (M = .605, SD = .03) syllogisms. There was a 
significant Group X Congruency interaction (F2, 51 = 6.642, p = 0.003).  
Post-hoc tests using Bonferroni showed, after Bonferroni correction for multiple 
comparisons, that the mean proportion of correct responses was significantly lower (p = 
.023) in the polar/orbital group (M = .624, SE = .041) than in the normal healthy control 
group (M = .772, SE = .033), and was significantly lower in the polar/orbital group than 
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in the parietal group (M = .780, SE = .033, p = .014). There was no significant difference 
(p = 1.00) between the parietal group and the normal control group (M = .772, SE = 
.033).  
Follow-up univariate ANOVA tests showed that there was no significant 
difference (F2, 51 = .383, p = .684)  among groups on emotional congruent reasoning 
(polar/orbital  M = .824, SE = .037; parietal M = .867, SE = .032; normal controls M = 
.845, SE = .031). However, there was a significant group difference (F2, 51 = 7.824, p = 
0.001) in emotional incongruent reasoning; Bonferroni post-hoc tests showed that 
emotional incongruent reasoning accuracy was significantly impaired (p = .002) among 
the polar/orbital group (M = .424, SE = .062) when compared to normal controls (M = 
.699, SE = .054), and when compared (p = .003) to the parietal group (M = .693, SE = 
.040). There was no significant difference (p = 1.000)  between the parietal and normal 
control groups (M = .699, SE = .054).  The results of these univarate and post-hoc tests 
survive Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons.
5
  
To address the question of whether the two types of incongruent trials 
(valid/unbelievable; invalid/believable) solicited different patterns or responses from 
patients, we followed up the incongruency analysis with a separate paired t-test within 
each group.  There were no significant differences within the polar/orbital group (or 
                                                        
5 For the sake of completeness, we conducted a mixed ANOVA (3 Group x 2 
Congruence, on neutral trials only), and found no difference among the groups for neutral 
items F2, 52 = .398, p = .674). The mean proportion of correct responses to neutral items 
was as follows: polar/orbital group (M = .733, SE = .042); parietal group (M = .698 , SE 
= .038); normal control group (M = .743 , SE =.034). 
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within the other groups) in mean accuracy on emotional trials by type of incongruence. 
(See Figure S1.) 
Finally, to examine reaction times we carried out univariate ANOVA tests. The 
mixed ANOVA (3 Group x 2 Congruency), neutral reaction times only, indicated a 
significant main effect of Congruency; responses to neutral incongruent trials (M = 24976 
ms, SE = 1488) were significantly slower (F1, 52 = 33.342, p = .001) than to neutral 
congruent trials (M = 21333 ms, SE = 1346). There was no significant Group X 
Congruency interaction (p = .446) for neutral reaction times, and no significant between-
groups difference (p = .443) in mean reaction times to neutral syllogisms. The mixed 
ANOVA (3 Group x 2 Congruency), emotional reaction times only, indicated a 
significant main effect of Congruency; responses to emotional incongruent trials (M = 
26668 ms, SE = 1659) were significantly slower (F1, 51 = 9.272, p = .004) than to 
emotional congruent trials (M = 22273 ms, SE = 1600). There was no significant Group 
X Congruency interaction (p = .584) for emotional reaction times, and no significant 
between-groups difference (p = .892) in mean reaction times to emotional syllogisms.  
 
As the effect on accuracy was driven by the emotional incongruent trials we 
further explored these by looking at the believability and the emotionality ratings of 
emotional trials. 
Belief Ratings 
Role of Polar/Orbital PFC in Emotional Reasoning Page 21 
We considered the possibility that the impaired performance of the polar/orbital 
group on reasoning in the emotional incongruent condition might be explained by a 
stronger (or weaker) commitment to beliefs in this group. To explore this possibility, we 
calculated the mean believability rating for each of the 20 emotional syllogisms 
separately, across all participants, and separately by each group. Then, we conducted a 
univariate analysis of mean ratings and found no significant differences in commitment to 
beliefs among the groups (F2, 57 = .012, p = .988).  We also conducted two separate 
univariate analyses of mean ratings, one of conclusions that were intended to be false, 
and the other of  conclusions that were intended to be true. There were no significant 
differences among groups in either analysis (intended false: F2, 27 = .160, p = .853; 
intended true: F2, 27 = .386, p = .683).  Thus, there was no difference in the strength (or 
weakness) of commitment to beliefs that might account for the impaired performance of 
polar/orbital patients on emotional incongruent reasoning trials.  
Emotionality Ratings 
Another possibility is that our effect of interest could have something to do with 
differences in emotional response to trials. To examine this possibility, we calculated, for 
each participant, for each of the valence/arousal categories, the proportion of the number 
of emotional trials rated in a specific category to the total number of rated emotional 
trials. For example, if a participant provided emotion ratings for all 20 trials, and the 
rating was ‘negative aroused’ for five trials, then the proportion of negative aroused trials 
for that participant was 5:20, or .25. Then we looked for group differences in the mean 
proportion of emotion ratings for each of the valence/arousal categories (negative 
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aroused, positive aroused, positive calm, negative calm), using a separate univariate 
analysis of variance for each category. There were no significant between-group 
differences in any of these four categories. Next, we repeated these analyses for the 
emotional incongruent trials only. Here, although we found a significant overall between-
group difference for the number of incongruent trials rated negative calm (F2, 53 = 3.409, 
p = .04), the post-hoc test (with Bonferroni correction) showed no significant differences 
between any pairs of the three groups; there was only a tendency (p = .073) for parietals 
to have more trials (mean 4.13, SD 1.87, n = 24) than controls (mean 2.69, SD 1.62, n = 
16).  
Correlational Analysis 
We carried out a correlational analysis between the extent of damage in Brodmann areas 
(collapsed across hemispheres) identified in Table 2 and performance accuracy in the 
reasoning task. The only significant finding was a negative correlation between volume 
loss in BA 11 (n=13) and performance on emotional reasoning trials (r = -.656, p = .028). 
Patients with larger lesions to BA 11 performed more poorly on the emotional trials. 
Furthermore, there was no correlation between performance on neutral reasoning trials 
and lesion extent in BA 11. There were no significant correlations between lesion extent 
in BA 10 and performance on neutral (n=15) or emotional (n=13) reasoning trials. 
Similarly, there were no significant correlations between lesion extent in BA  46, 47, and 
9 and performance in either the emotional (n=7, 7, 10 respectively) or neutral (n=9, 8, 9 
respectively) reasoning trials. 
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Discussion 
The goal of the study was to test the hypothesis that neurological patients with 
focal lesions largely confined to regions of BA 10 and BA 11 are selectively impaired, 
compared to normal healthy controls, in reasoning about emotionally charged material 
but not in reasoning about neutral material. Our results support the hypothesis. Patients 
with lesions to polar/orbital PFC regions reasoned well about arguments with neutral 
content but were selectively impaired in reasoning about the identical logical forms with 
emotionally charged content, in particular, on incongruent reasoning trials. Furthermore, 
only lesion extent in BA 11 (negatively) correlated with performance on reasoning items 
with emotionally charged content. 
The reasons for the good performance of the polar/orbital patients in reasoning 
with emotionally neutral material is reasonably clear. Neuroimaging studies have not 
activated these regions in logical reasoning tasks involving categorical syllogisms (Goel, 
2007; Prado et al., 2011).
6
  So if they are not recruited by the task, damage to these areas 
may have minimal impact on task performance. The reasons for their impaired 
performance in reasoning about emotionally charged material require further discussion. 
These results cannot be explained by differences in IQ scores (preinjury or post 
injury), years of education, or lesion size, as these did not differ among groups. There 
                                                        
6 There is one imaging study (Monti et al., 2007) that has reported activation in left BA 
10 in a deductive reasoning task involving propositional logic connectives using neutral 
content (rather than the categorial syllogism task we are using). However a meta-analysis 
study by Prado et al. (2011) questions the robustness of this result, even in the context of 
propositional connectives. Certainly our patients with lesions to BA 10 are not impaired 
in the neutral reasoning condition. 
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was a significant between-group difference in working memory; but only in the parietal 
group. Nevertheless, the parietal group patients performed as well as the normal controls 
on all conditions (Figures 2 & 3), suggesting that their levels of working memory were 
sufficient for the task. 
It is also known from the reasoning literature that variables, such as logical form, 
congruency, and negation can have an impact on reasoning task performance (Dickstein, 
1978; Evans et al., 1983; Evans & Over, 1996) and recruit different neural systems (Goel, 
2007; Goel et al., 2000; Goel & Dolan, 2003a; Prado et al., 2011). These factors were 
balanced for (see Methods) and can be discounted as contributing to the results. 
Another possibility is that the results are driven by a difference in the level of 
abstraction between the neutral content and emotional content materials. It might be 
argued that perhaps the former tend to be more concrete and imageable (i.e. being about 
fruit, boats, coffee, etc. ) than the latter ( i.e. being about homosexuals, terrorists, Iraqis 
etc.). There are known differences in brain regions involved in reasoning about more 
concrete and more abstract materials (Goel et al., 2000).  More concrete reasoning trials 
tend to activate left lateral frontal systems while more abstract reasoning trials activate 
bilateral frontal lateral/dorsolateral systems (Goel et al., 2000). This is a hemispheric 
difference controlled for in our patient selection, by matching up the number of patients 
with left and right PFC lesions. We are unaware of any data indicating that BA 10/11 
may be differentially involved in reasoning about more abstract items. 
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It is also possible that our effect of interest might be a function of group 
differences in the perception of emotionality in the syllogisms. However, we found no 
significant between-group differences in mean self-reported emotionality measures. 
Yet another possibility is that differences in performance between the emotional 
and the neutral items may have nothing to do with emotion. If the orbital/polar PFC 
patients found emotional items more believable or unbelievable than the neutral items, 
then the effect of interest could be explained in terms of a stronger evocation of belief 
(and thus an increased belief-bias effect) (Evans et al., 1983). However, there were no 
group differences in mean believability ratings. 
So even though polar/orbital PFC patients were no more likely to believe 
emotionally charged statements such as "all Muslims are terrorists" than normal controls, 
they were more likely to draw incorrect conclusions from emotionally charged arguments 
such as:  
(C) 
All Americans are brave people.  
No brave people are War Veterans.  
No Americans are War Veterans. 
but not  
(D) 
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Some apples are sweet fruit.  
All sweet fruit are grapes.  
Some grapes are apples. 
The key to understanding the results may be found by examining the steps 
involved in solving incongruent reasoning problems (like C & D). As noted previously, in 
incongruent trials, there is a conflict between the believability of the conclusion and the 
response dictated by the logic of the argument. The key steps in successfully responding 
to these trials are (1) detecting the conflict between the believability of the conclusion 
(unbelievable in C & D) and the logical form/validity of the argument (valid in C & D); 
(2) suppressing the prepotent urge to respond on the basis of the believability of the 
conclusion (i.e. the belief-bias effect); and (3) formally/logically evaluating the argument. 
What is interesting is that the polar/orbital PFC patients performed as well as the 
control groups on the neutral content incongruent trials like D. So they are clearly capable 
of detecting the conflict, overcoming the belief-bias effect, and formally/logically 
evaluating the arguments, at least in the neutral content condition. This is consistent with 
the neuroimaging data which do not show activation of polar/orbital PFC in reasoning 
with neutral content (Goel, 2007; Prado et al., 2011). 
In both examples, C and D, the conclusions are equally false and unbelievable. It 
is patently false that "some grapes are apples" and equally false that "no Americans are 
War veterans". In both cases the conclusions would elicit an automatic 'no' response. 
However, the correct logical response to the argument requires a 'yes' response, requiring 
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a suppression of beliefs. In the case of D, suspending the belief that "some grapes are 
apples" is an intellectual exercise correlated with IQ and working memory (Stanovich & 
West, 2000). The suppression of the belief "no Americans are War veterans" (especially 
if you are an American war veteran), however, requires not only suppression of the belief 
but also suppression of unpleasant emotional content (with valence and arousal 
components).  The polar/orbital patients have no difficulty in dealing with simple falsity, 
but when the falsity involves unpleasant emotional content they are unable to suppress it. 
In the case of the normal controls, also Vietnam War veterans, suppression of the two 
beliefs in the conclusions of C and D seem to be equally successful.  
We propose that an intact polar/orbital prefrontal cortex is required to filter the 
emotional content from the argument, and if this is done prior to the logical evaluation, 
the two conclusions should be equally easy, or difficult, to suppress.  To the extent that 
filtering is successful, the content will be treated as neutral by the reasoning system. To 
the extent that filtering is not successful, as a result of individual differences or 
pathology, as in the case of our polar/orbital PFC patients, to that extent the unfiltered 
emotionally charged content will pass on to the reasoning system and cause disruptions in 
the detection of conflict between the believability of the conclusion and the logical 
form/validity of the argument; and/or overcoming the prepotent belief-bias effect; and/or 
the logical evaluation of the argument. Our experimental design does not allow us to 
differentiate between these three possibilities.  
The finding that polar/orbital PFC patients perform well on neutral reasoning 
trials is consistent with a large number of imaging studies which implicate the left lateral 
PFC (BA 44, 45, 47) but not BA 10/11 in logical reasoning tasks using categorical 
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syllogisms (Baggio et al., 2016; Goel, 2007; Goel et al., 2000; Goel et al., 2000; Goel & 
Dolan, 2003a; Prado et al., 2011; Reverberi et al., 2012; Waechter, Goel, Raymont, 
Kruger, & Grafman, 2013). The finding that polar/orbital PFC patients are impaired in 
reasoning with emotional content is consistent with the findings of a number of studies 
implicating orbital cortex in impaired affective processing in various tasks, including 
affective theory of mind reasoning (Shamay-Tsoory, Tibi-Elhanany, & Aharon-Peretz, 
2006), mentalizing (Shamay-Tsoory & Aharon-Peretz, 2007), emotional perspective-
taking (Hynes, Baird, & Grafton, 2006), moral reasoning/decision making (Greene, 
Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Harenski & Hamann, 2006; Moll, de 
Oliveira-Souza, Bramati, & Grafman, 2002; Schaich Borg, Hynes, Van Horn, Grafton, & 
Sinnott-Armstrong, 2006), and decision making (Bar‐On, Tranel, Denburg, & Bechara, 
2003; Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1997).   
 
Interestingly, while it is widely accepted that lesions to orbital prefrontal cortex 
lead to impairments in emotional processing, basic details of how they do so are still 
largely unclear. For example, in one study involving a moral judgment task (not a rational 
decision making task) the authors argue that damage to ventral medial PFC leads to a 
blunting or muting of emotional response and an increase in utilitarian responses 
compared to normal controls (Koenigs et al., 2007). However, some of the same authors, 
in another study involving a rational decision making task (the Ultimatum Game), 
conclude that lesions to ventral medial PFC lead to responses guided by enhanced, 
unbridled emotions (Koenigs & Tranel, 2007). The latter is in line with our own 
conclusion that damage to polar/orbital PFC results in a failure of filtering of emotional 
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content from the logical arguments before they are passed on to the reasoning system. 
Perhaps, the larger point here is that much remains to be understood about how 
polar/orbital frontal cortex interacts with task and contextual demands to modulate 
emotional processing. 
As a final point, it is also worth emphasizing the importance of our negative 
result: i.e. that there is no difference between patients with lesions to the parietal lobes 
and normal controls in reasoning about categorical syllogisms. This is an important 
finding in that several imaging studies suggest that the parietal cortex (in particular ßBA 
7 & 40) is critical for logical reasoning (Knauff et al., 2003). Most of our parietal patients 
did have lesions to BA 7 & 10 (Table 3), yet performed as well as normal controls in all 
conditions of the reasoning task. These negative results reinforce the point that 
recruitment of different brain regions for logical reasoning is a function of the content 
and logical form of arguments (Goel, 2007; Prado et al., 2011). For categorical 
syllogisms, the critical region seems to be prefrontal cortex, while for transitive inference 
parietal lobes play a necessary role (Waechter et al., 2013). 
In conclusion, it is widely accepted that lesions to orbital prefrontal cortex lead to 
emotion-related disruptions and poor decision-making. Our patients with polar/orbital 
lesions were cognitively intact, as measured by standard neuropsychological tests. Their 
logical reasoning abilities, in the absence of emotional content, were as good as that of 
normal controls. Their self-reported judgments of the emotionality of statements were 
similar to that of normal controls. Furthermore, they were no more likely to believe 
emotionally charged statements such as "all Muslims are terrorists." But nonetheless, 
their ability to reason about emotionally charged content was selectively impaired. We 
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suggest that the polar/orbital prefrontal cortex serves a role in filtering emotional content 
from arguments before they are passed on to the reasoning system in more lateral/dorsal 
regions of prefrontal cortex. Where unfiltered content is passed to the reasoning engine, 
either as a result of pathology (as in the case of our patients) or as a result of individual 
differences, reasoning performance suffers. 
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Figure legends 
Figure 1. a) Lesion overlay maps for patients displayed on transverse slices (L=R) of the 
AAL Atlas, found in ABLe software (Medical Numerics Inc.) (Makale et al., 2002).  a) 
Slices 54-89 of polar/orbital lesions patient group at overlap threshold of 2.  b) Slices 
110-149 of parietal lesions patient group at overlap threshold of 2. See text.  
Figure 2. Group by Content interaction. Orbital/polar PFC patients are selectively 
impaired in reasoning with emotional content.  
Figure 3. a) Accuracy rate on congruent trials as a function of content; b) Accuracy rate 
on incongruent trials as a function of content.  
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Number of Participants 
(n) 
17 24 22 
Education (Year) 14.00 (1.68)  
(n= 16) 
15.61 (2.54)  
(n = 23) 
15.00 (2.82)  
(n = 21) 
Pre-injury IQ (AFQT-7A) 
in percentile rank 
59.12 (24.17) 60.45 (27.09) 
(n = 22) 
65.95 (21.81) 
Post_injury IQ (AFQT-
7A) in percentile rank 
65.93 (23.77)  
(n = 15) 
67.19 (28.57)  
(n = 21) 
75.33 (18.62) 
 (n = 18) 
WAIS-III    
 Full Scale (IQ) 
 Verbal (IQ) 














 General Memory 






92.13 (13.46)  





BDI 12.24 (12.41) 6.50 (5.54) 11.36 (8.22) 
SCID – GAF 74.93 (11.70)  
(n = 15) 
77.25 (11.86) 73.73 (11.60) 
Lesion Volumes Loss 
(cc) 
20.14 (10.84) 28.94 (25.20) 0 
AFQT-7A = Armed Forces Qualification Test; WAIS = Wechsler Adult Intelligence 
Scale; WMS = Wechsler Memory Scale; BDI = Beck Depression Inventory; SCID-GAF 
= Structural Clinical Interview for DSM-IV – Global Assessment Function.  
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Table 4. Sample Syllogisms. The full set of syllogisms are provided in the Appendix in 
Supplementary Material. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
   Neutral Content   Emotional Content 
Congruent All gods are immortal.  Some terrorists are Iraqis. 
 No immortal beings are men.  All Iraqis are Arabs. 
 No men are gods.  Some Arabs are terrorists. 
 (valid, believable conclusion)  (valid, believable conclusion) 
    
 No skiers are smokers.  No Americans read the Bible. 
 Some men are not skiers.  Some Americans are homosexuals. 
 All men are smokers.  All homosexuals read the Bible. 
 (invalid, unbelievable 
conclusion) 
 (invalid, unbelievable conclusion) 
    
Incongruent Some apples are sweet fruit.  All Americans are brave people. 
 All sweet fruit are grapes.  No brave people are Vietnam veterans.  
 Some grapes are apples.  No Vietnam veterans are Americans. 
 (valid, unbelievable conclusion)  (valid, unbelievable conclusion) 
    
 No coffee contains nicotine.  No Americans are vicious. 
 No nicotine is found in tea.  Some serial killers are Americans. 
 No tea contains coffee.  All serial killers are vicious. 
 (invalid, believable conclusion)  (invalid, believable conclusion) 
 
 
Table 2. Percentage of each Brodmann Area (BA) lesioned in PFC patients.  
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Table 3. Percentage of each Brodmann Areas (BA) lesioned in parietal patients. 
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Polar/orbital lesions selectively impair logical reasoning about emotionally charged 
material 
 
P/O lesions do not impair logical reasoning with neutral content 
 
It is proposed that P/O cortex filters emotional content for rational thought 
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